Abstract. Security protocols are crucial to achieve trusted computing. However, designing security protocols is not easy and so security protocols are typically faulty and have to be repaired. Continuing previous work we present first steps to automate this repairing process, especially for protocols that are susceptible to type-flaw attacks. To this end, we extend the notion of strand spaces by introducing an implementation layer for messages and extending the capabilities of a penetrator to swap messages that share the same implementation. Based on this framework we are able to track type flaw attacks to incompatibilities between the way messages are implemented and the design of concrete security protocols. Heuristics are given to either change the implementation or the protocol to avoid these situations.
Introduction
A security protocol is a protocol that aims to establish one or more security goals, often a combination of integrity, authentication or confidentiality. Security protocols are critical applications, since they are crucial to achieve trusted computing. So they are thoroughly studied to guarantee that there does not exist an interleaving of protocol runs violating a security goal, called an attack.
Designing correct security protocols, however, has proven to be problematic, since it is difficult to anticipate what an adversary can learn from observing the simultaneous execution of an arbitrary number of protocols, given some initial knowledge. Under the formal approach to security protocol verification, the adversary usually is Dolev-Yao: he is able to delay messages or prevent them reach their destination; he can analyse messages without breaking cryptography; he can build messages using his initial knowledge or reusing components from messages previously intercepted; he can send messages as if they were of his own or somebody else's.
Protocol flaws can usually be understood as violations to well-known design guidelines, such as those given in [17, 2, 1] . These kinds of principles capture prudent practises in security protocol design, while pinpointing features that make protocols difficult to verify or possibly susceptible to an attack, and should thus be avoided. Principles in [1] spot flaws caused by overlooking information security flow, while those in [17, 2] spot flaws, commonly referred to as protocol failures, caused by misusing cryptosystems. In this paper, attention is restricted only to the design principles given in [1] .
Guidelines for protocol design should be treated carefully, though. This is partly because they capture prudent practises of the 1990's, when aspects like resilience or denial-of-service attacks were not considered yet. But this is also partly because some guidelines are rather cunbersome. For example, some principles are unnecessarily normative, suggesting one should add full information to every protocol message (protocol ID, session ID, etc.) or suggesting one should use different encryption systems or add hashings to each message, e.g. [6, 3] . Protocol designers are often unwilling to follow these guidelines. They aim at achieving security guarantees by applying a combination of cryptographic primitives.
A type flaw attack is a kind of replay attack 3 where a principal accepts a message of one type as a message of another. Heather et al. [11] have shown that it is possible, under certain circustamces and protocol assumptions, to prevent type flaw attacks by tagging every protocol message, and elements thereof, with a string indicating its intended type. However, as noticed by Malladi and AlvesFoss [13] , message tagging makes it easier to elaborate a password guessing attack. This is because each tag provides the adversary a means for identifying a hit, since the tag, which is a meaningful string, might become readable after a code cracking attempt.
In this paper, we shall prove that blind message tagging is unnecessary. We shall argue that to prevent a type flaw attack, it is enough to adopt good practises of message encoding, as proposed by [1] . In particular, upon reception of a protocol message, an agent should be able to verify that the message is associated to a particular protocol step and to a particular run (see design principles 6-8 and 10). We shall see that our approach can provide a protocol message with as much tagging as necessary but also as less tagging as possible without getting faulty.
Continuing previous work [12] , we propose a method that aims at automatically fixing security protocols that are susceptible to a replay attack. We rely on existing state-of-the-art tools, such as OFMC [5, 4] or Cl-Atse [8, 7] , capable of finding a type flaw attack to an input faulty protocol. Our method then analyses the protocol and the attack to identify the faulty steps of the protocol and synthesises appropriate changes to fix them. This yields an improved version of the protocol that should be analysed and potentially patched again until no further flaws can be detected.
To capture type flaw attacks, we extend the notion of strand spaces [19] (see Section 2). Crucial to our approach is the distinction of a protocol specification at an abstract level and the implementation of messages at a concrete level. A type flaw attack is feasible only if the penetrator is capable of supplying a honest principal a camouflaged message whose implementation equals that of the message being spoofed.
We discuss on the soundness of the extended version of strand spaces (see Section 3) and provide a method for automatic protocol repair (see Section 4).
Strands for Type Flaw Attacks

Message Terms
Abstract messages, ranged over by M 1 , M 2 , . . ., are also called terms. The set of terms, A, is freely generated from two disjoint sets, the set of texts (T) and the set of keys (K), by means of concatenation, M 1 ; M 2 , and encryption, {|M | } K (K ∈ K). T contains Nonce, the set of nonces, N a , N [19] , is the least relation such that:
We extend to a homomorphism over sets of terms in the expected manner. A message is atomic if it is not an encrypted term or a concatenated one.
is not a concatenated term, and for every 
Axioms (5)- (8) specify that the identification of different (abstract) messages can only occur between messages of different types. If two nonces are considered to be different on the abstract level then we also assume that their implementations are different. However, we can still identify, for instance, the implementation of a nonce with the implementation of an encrypted message or a timestamp.
Strands, Strand Spaces and Bundles
A strand is a sequence of nodes. Every node in a strand denotes a communicating event, where transmission (respectively reception) of a term M is denoted as +M (respectively −M ). Accordingly, we will call a node n either positive or negative and will use msg(n) and sign(n) to respectively obtain the node term and the communication event thereby denoted. 
A strand represents a protocol run from the local perspective of a participant. If the participant is honest, the strand, as well as each individual strand node, is said to be regular and penetrator otherwise. A strand space Σ is a set of strands, where ⇒ and → impose a graph structure on the nodes of Σ. The pair (Σ, P) is said to be an infiltrated strand space, whenever Σ is a strand space and P ⊆ Σ, such that every p ∈ P is a penetrator strand.
A penetrator strand hooks together several penetrator traces, which are actions that characterise the abilities of the penetrator, according to the standard Dolev-Yao model. Our extension to the penetrator model consists of adding the I action, which captures the penetrator's ability of causing a type flaw attack.
Definition 2 (Penetrator Trace).
Let K P denote the keys initially known to the penetrator; then, a penetrator trace is (as given in [19] ) one of the following:
plus the action I defined by: In an infiltrated strand space, (Σ, P), penetrator traces of type M are assumed to be unable to model unguessable nonces and so the penetrator can build masquerading messages using M, K, F, T, C, S, E, D and I, only. Thus, to persuade a honest principal that a camouflaging message can be accepted to spoof some other, the penetrator has the obligation of proving that, at the object level, the implementation of both messages are equal.
Definition 3. A finite, acyclic graph
and ii) if n 1 ⇒ n 2 then n 1 ∈ N and n 1 = s, i and n 2 = s, i + 1 . Let B be a bundle, then ≺ B and B denote respectively the transitive and the transitivereflexive closure of (→ ∪ ⇒).
A bundle is said to be regular if it contains no penetrator strands and penetrator otherwise. A message M is said to be a component of a node n if it is a component of msg(n). A node n is said to be an M, K, etc. node if n lies on a penetrator strand with a trace of kind M, K, etc.
In the original approach, the notion of a node originating a term is a syntactical property of strands [19] :
M is said to be uniquely originating if it originates on a unique n ∈ N ." So, if for instance the term is a nonce, depending on whether the nonce occurs first in a received or in a sent message of a strand, the associated principal can either reuse the nonce received from elsewhere or create a fresh one. Here, we have to lift this notion of nodes that originate terms to match our extended version of strand spaces. This is because when considering the concrete representation of messages it is possible that different (abstract) messages share the same implementation. Hence, considering the reception of a message by a principal on the abstract level allows us to conceal the fact that that principal gets also knowledge about other messages sharing the same implementation. The only principal caring about this ambiguity at the implementation level is, of course, the penetrator, since he may want to tunnel a message camouflaged as a different one along a protocol run. Upon the reception of the camouflaged message he is also aware of the spoofed message and the I-rule allows him to switch between these different (abstract) messages.
The following definition allows us to collect the information about the camouflage actions that the penetrator has performed up to a specific node in the bundle.
Definition 4.
Let B = N , (→ ∪ ⇒) be a bundle and let n 1 and n 2 be nodes in B (n 1 , n 2 ∈ N). Whenever there is an I trace in B with nodes n 1 and n 2 having signed terms −M and +M , respectively, with M ≡ M , we write itr B (n 1 , −M, n 2 , +M ).
Definition 5 (Scope). Let B = N , (→ ∪ ⇒) be a bundle and let n ∈ N.
Then, the set of spoofed actions up to node n, called the scope of n, wrt B, written Sc B (n), is given by:
The knowledge of the camouflaged messages is crucial for the refined notion of originating nodes: Definition 6. Let B = N , (→ ∪ ⇒) be a bundle and let n ∈ N be a node in B. An atomic term M originates at n iff:
Before concluding this section, we illustrate the notions above with example descriptions of two protocol attack.
Woo and Lam's Protocol Attack
For brevity, protocols will be specified using Alice and Bob notation. So a protocol is given by a sequence of steps, each of the form q. A → B : M , meaning that, at step q, agent A sends message M to agent B, which B receives. We use S and Spy to refer to the server and the penetrator, respectively. Consider the Woo and Lam π 1 Protocol [20]:
The Woo and Lam π 1 protocol exhibits a type flaw attack, which is based on the property that the implementation of nonces can be confused with the implementation of encrypted messages. We capture this property by refining our theory of implementation for this protocol with the corresponding additional axiom:
Then, the penetrator bundle illustrating a type flaw attack on this protocol is as follows:
This example penetrator bundle contains two I traces: the first is −N b , + {|M | } K and the second − {|A;
The node p 3 with msg(p 3 ) = {|M | } K is an originating node for M and K because both messages do not occur in the previous message, N b , of the first I trace (when read from top to bottom). Nor do they occur in the scope of p 2 , with msg(p 2 ) = N b (which is actually empty). In order to justify the use of the I trace, we have to guarantee that N b ≈ {|M | } K . Since M and K originate at this I trace we do not care about the resulting values of M and K in the spoofed message. Selecting the witnesses (skolem-terms) of the existential quantified variables in (9) the proof obligation is a simple instance of (9) .
By contrast consider the second I trace, even though N b does not occur in msg(p 4 ), the node p 5 with msg(p 5 ) = {|A; B; N b | } K bs is not an originating node for N b . However, N b occurs in the scope of node p 5 :
This context knowledge in combination with axiom (2) guarantees the property
and therefore the soundness of the I-rule application.
The KP Protocol
Snekkenes [18] discusses the KP protocol, which is subject to a type flaw attack. The protocol is as follows:
1.
A→ The attack is based on the facts that:
1. on step 3, the principal B extracts {|A; B; N a ; K S | } Kas from the component encrypted under K bs and then, on step 4, sends this extracted message to A; 2. keys share common implementations with agents and encrypted messages; and 3. therefore the implementation of the message in step 3 can be misinterpreted (in a different run) as the implementation of the first component of the message in step 4.
Similar to the previous example, an appropriate theory of message implementations contain axioms to deduce the fact that keys (generated dynamically by the server) and agents (or encrypted messages, respectively) potentially share the same implementation: Fig. 1 illustrates the resulting attack in the strand space notation using our notion of I-traces. This example contains three I-traces. Node p 7 originates the key K S on the penetrator strand. Since this key has not been seen by the regular principles, the penetrator is free to choose its value and axiom (10) applies. Similar arguments hold for p 9 originating M and K using axiom (11) . The scope of p 10 is {A ≈ K S , K S ≈ {|M | } K } which trivially implies that the messages in p 10 and p 11 share the same implementation.
Feasibility of Type Flaw Attacks
Extending Strand Space Theory
In the last section we extended the strand space notation by an axiomatic specification of messages at an implementation level and by an additional I penetrator strand connecting this implementation level with the abstract level of strand spaces. While the original purpose of this extension was to provide a uniform representation language for protocol runs (potentially containing type flaw attacks), it is also interesting to investigate how the verification methodology of strand spaces can be lifted to our extended approach. A central part of this methodology are outgoing (or ingoing, respectively) authentication tests [10] . Suppose, a nonce N is only known by an honest principal. If this principal sends this nonce N as part of an encrypted message {|M | } K around and later on receives the same nonce in clear text (i.e. outside its original encryption by K) then somebody must have decrypted the message possessing the appropriate key K −1 . If this key is only knowledgeable to a single person (and has not been sent around) then we can conclude that this particular person has been involved in processing the message.
The question arises whether this property holds also including I-traces. Suppose, N occurs outside of its encryption by K in the second node of an I-trace. We consider two cases. First, suppose N originates at the second node of the I-trace. In this case the message used to create N has been created without any knowledge of N since otherwise N would be part of the scope of the particular I-trace node, which would contradict our assumption that N originates at the I-trace. Now, suppose that N does not originate at the I-trace node. Either N is (unencrypted) also part of the received first message of the I-trace and we can use the argument of the original strand space theorem that this cannot happen or there is a type confusion going on and both messages of the I-trace share the same interpretation. Since the equality of implementation has to be implied by the scope of the node (and by assumption N occurs only encrypted with K in the scope), this can only be true iff the implementation of the encryption satisfies some non-standard properties (i.e. it can be simulated by some other operation on messages without K −1 ).
Implementation
In our approach we separate the protocol level operating on abstract messages from its implementation level. This is in contrast to many other approaches that Fig. 1 . Type flaw attack in the KP-protocol in [18] encode implementation details in an equality theory on (abstract) messages. The benefit is that we can use (arbitrary) algebraic specifications to formalise properties (in particular equality and inequality) of the message implementation. This knowledge about the implementation is used to verify side conditions of Itraces. In order to apply I-traces in the penetrator bundle we have to make sure that both messages of the trace share the same implementation. This is a task that can be given to an automated theorem prover or to specialised deduction system incorporating domain specific knowledge (e.g. SMT-provers).
Axioms (1)- (8) reflect only the minimal requirements to an implementation. Typically, one would extend this set of axioms by a more detailed specification of how messages and their operations are implemented. It is easy to formalise a message implementation theory that takes care of the length of messages, i.e. that assumes that all types of atomic messages have a specific length. Then, reasoning about such a theory requires arithmetic (and in the worst case properties of least common multiples). Another possibility is use Meadow's probabilistic approach [15] to reason about the equality of the implementations of two messages. However, this is still future work.
The axiomatisation given in our examples is idealistic in a sense that we define possible type flaws regardless of the concrete instances of a nonce or key. It might be the case that there are some nonces that do not share the implementation with any encrypted message. However, incorporating this sort of probabilistic information would cause a far more complex specification of the implementation theory and therefore we stick to a generalisation of such properties which result in a worst case analysis.
The execution of the I-rule is trivial as it only forwards a received message duping the receiver of the message that it would be a different abstract message. The crucial question is then: how likely is it that a penetrator can betray the receiver in such a way? The philosophy behind the design of strand spaces was that the independent choice of two nonces will result in two different nonces. This philosophy is implemented in demanding that nonces have to be uniquely originating in bundles. Similarly, we typically assume that choosing independently two different abstract messages will also result in two different messages on the implementation level.
I traces impose the restriction on the occurring messages that their implementations have to be equal. In contrast to standard bundles, as introduced in [19] , the property of being a bundle depends on the theory of implementations and for each proposed instance −t, +t of an I trace we have to verify the constraints that t ≈ t . An atomic message originating in t can be "freely" chosen by the penetrator who selects an appropriate instance the implementation of which is equal to the corresponding bits of the implementation of t. If the message does not originate in t its value is fixed by the bundle at some other node and we have to prove that its implementation is equal to the corresponding bits of the implementation of t.
Repairing a security protocol susceptible to a type flaw attack can be, accordingly, achieved at the abstract level, at the concrete level or at a combination thereof. Protocol repair at the abstract level involves changing the structure of the camouflaged message so that it can no longer spoof the other (or vice versa). By contrast, protocol repair at the concrete level is achieved by modifying the theory of implementation underlying the input faulty protocol; these changes ought to guarantee that each application of the I-rule is no longer sound. We now elaborate on protocol repair at the abstract level.
Protocol Repair at the Abstract Level
The intruder can elaborate a type flaw attack on a protocol whenever he is able to make a protocol principal accept a message of one type, M , as a message of another, M . In that case, M and M share the same implementation, M ≈ M . Thus, to remove the protocol type flaw, it suffices to break M ≈ M .
Following [12] , we approach protocol repair by translating some of Abadi and Needham's informal principles for the design of security protocols [1] into formal requirements on sets of protocol steps. In particular, here we focus on principle 10: A message is properly encoded if it is possible to deduce that the message belongs to a protocol, including the protocol step, and in fact to a particular run of the protocol [1] .
We attempt to achieve proper encoding of a message M by rearranging its structure while keeping its meaning intact. If this operation does not suffice to break the confusion between M and M , we may then insert into M vacuous terms, tags actually, as in [11] . Finally, when incurring on these changes, we make sure that the new protocol message does not clash with some other. The following definitions are used in the definition of our patch method. 
Definition 7 (Visible Content). The visible content ct S (M ) of a message M wrt a set of keys S is given by:
Definition 10 (Collision Freeness). Let S be a set of keys, let M be a message and let A ⊆ A be a set of messages. M is collision free with respect to A iff for all M ∈ ct S (M ) and for all M ∈ A it is the case that M ≈ M .
Our method for the repair of a security protocol susceptible to a replay attacks is shown in Fig. 2 . 4 It is given as a patch method [12] . A patch method is a 4-tuple (name, input, preconditions, patch). The first component is the name of the method. The second component is the input, the description of faulty protocol P , a bundle B describing the attack, and a representative bundle B R describing the intended run of the protocol. The third component is the preconditions, a formula written in a meta-logic that the input objects must satisfy. We use these preconditions to predict whether the associated patch will make the protocol no longer susceptible to the attack. The fourth component is the patch, a procedure specifying how to mend the input protocol.
When input the Woo and Lam π 1 protocol, and upon the proviso that:
the abstract-level type flaw method repairs it, yielding: To be able to apply the I rule with this mended protocol, the penetrator would have to prove:
which, by (13) , requires in turn that:
Which contradicts (12) . We now elaborate on protocol repair at the concrete level.
Protocol Repair at the Concrete Level
We assume an underlying theory of message implementation, I. I accommodates axioms (1)-(8) as well as others that are particular to a concrete development of messages. Example of these kinds of additional axioms may involve:
In general, axioms other than basic are either about type disjunction or about properties of compound messages, such as type length, c.f. (13) . Clearly, at the implementation level, a type flaw attack is possible because I contains axioms that overlook a means of explicitly providing type disjunction. For instance, the type flaw attack on the Woo and Lam π 1 protocol is justified when I contains axiom (9) , where an encrypted message can be confused with a nonce. Repairing a protocol at the concrete level can thus be achieved by removing from I these kinds of overlooking axioms while explicitly adding their negation. This way the I trace is no longer applicable. The method presented in Fig. 3 Since we reason backwards, from a formula to the axioms, implications can be used as rewrite-rules from right to left. We use R B and R C to respectively denote the set of rewrite-rules gained from (1)- (8) and from the axioms stating properties of compound messages, such as (13) .
When input the KP protocol, and under the assumption that we use (1)- (8) and (13) as rewrites, the concrete-level type flaw patch method will remove (10) and (11) from I, while inserting into it the following axioms: 
Related Work
In the past several approaches have been developed to deal with potential typeflaw attacks. This work can be classified into two different areas. The first area is concerned with changing the representation of messages to prevent type-flaw attacks in the first place. Heather et al. [11] use a tagging of messages to identify the type of a message in a unique way. Considering original messages combined with their tagging as new atomic entities, such messages constitute a generated algebraic datatype with non-overlapping ranges of the constructors satisfying the most important properties of the abstract message theory. Since tags themselves will reveal information about a message to a penetrator there are several refinements of this tagging approach to minimize the set of subterms of a message that have to be tagged (e.g. [13, 14] ). The second area is concerned with the verification of protocols that may contain type-flaw attacks. A prominent approach is to replace the standard representation of messages as a freely generated datatype by a more involved datatype dealing with equations between constructor terms. As a consequence terms representing messages have to be unified modulo a theory modelling the equality relation on messages [4, 7, 9] . While this approach assumes that only entire messages can be interpreted in different ways, Meadows [15, 16] investigated the problem that the implementation of a message could be cut into pieces and one of such pieces might be used to mock another message, e.g. some part of a bit string representing an encrypted message is reused as a nonce. In her model messages are represented as bit streams. Based on an information flow analysis of the protocol and the knowledge of how abstract messages are represented as bit streams probabilities are computed as to how likely a message could be guessed (or constructed) by a penetrator. This is in contrast to our possibilistic approach in which we abstract from unlikely events, e.g. that independently guessing a key and a nonce will result in messages that share the same implementation. This is reflected in our notion of originating messages occurring on I traces. The strand space approach excludes protocol runs in which messages are not uniquely originating resulting in a possibilitic approach in a somewhat idealised world. In our approach, for instance, a nonce can be only camouflaged by a message which itself is camouflaged at some point with the help of the same nonce (c.f. definition 6).
